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Abstract 
In order to analyze current state of events in the world economy, parallel analysis with the 
country that has gone through boom cycle in real estate and financial asset prices (as US did 
during the last decade) and sudden consequential bust in mid 70s and late 80s (USA 2007), 
namely Japan, is performed. The definition and role of money in the economy in its various 
forms from narrow to the most broad credit aggregates and interrelations between central 
bank policy and growth of credit is discussed.   
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Japanese example in the 70s – the problem solved 
Due to abandonment of fixed exchange rate system in 1971, dollar has depreciated against all 
major currencies (since it has been overvalued in fixed exchange regime and no depreciation 
was possible). Bank of Japan (BoJ) and Ministry of Finance of Japan (MoF)1 were concerned 
with slower export growth and to support the economy expanded credit significantly. By 1973, 
it became clear that excess credit creation was being used merely for speculative land and 
asset transactions, thus pushing up asset prices. Urban land prices jumped by more than 50% 
from 1972 to 19742. It was BoJ that acted as the catalyst for a turn in the business cycle 
through its key policy  tool, window guidance3. From 1973 it imposed tight window guidance 
loan growth ceilings. The tight control lasted two full years, until early 1975. Bad debts began 
to pile up in the banking system. As the banks became paralyzed by the bad debt, they reduced 
lending. The necessary and sufficient condition for economic recovery had been an increase in 
the credit growth. In the late 1975 and early 1976 the BoJ had raised its window guidance loan 
growth ceilings. In sum, only new credit via window guidance (forced credit) was able to turn 
the economy. 
Japanese experience in late 80s – the problem not solved. 
For reasons beyond the scope of this paper from about 1986 onwards, banks increased credit 
creation aggressively. Meanwhile, the ability of the economy to service these loans – national 
income – only grew about half as fast. It was classic case of unproductive excess credit 
creation: money was produced by the banking system but not used productively. Instead, it 
was used for speculation or consumption. Bank loans can be called the borrowing of the nation. 
The ability to service loans depends on income generation. That is GDP growth. The visible 
problem was the in the late 1980s, Japanese bank loans grew double digits, while nominal 
GDP rose by no more than 6%. In 1989, banks suddenly restricted loan growth. During the 
course of 90s, BoJ did not create credit in the economy, intensifying deflation pressure4. BoJ 
engaged in quantitative easing (QE) in 2001. Success of these operations has been limited. 
Understanding credit and its role in economic growth 
Central bank does not target amount of credit (money) in the economy, it targets short term 
interest rate (bank reserves) to run monetary policy today5 . By having too much excess 
reserves (which central bank can create via open market operations), banks can expand credit 
(deposits) in the economy and make profit on the difference between cost of liabilities and 
                                                          
1 Before 1998, responsible for monetary policy conduct in Japan. 
2 Werner (2003) 
3 BoJ controlled the amount of credit that the economy would recieve. 
4 The reason as in Werner (2003) is that BoJ wanted structural change in the economy and simply granting credit would have not 
achieved this. Therefore, no credit was granted.  
5 Many countries that introduced monetary targeting failed. The Bank of England went through a number of monetary targets 
without success. It finally abolished the procedure entirely in the mid-1980s. The bank of Japan was more successful, it met 
monetary targets with the utmost precision. By precisely controlling credit creation through its window guidance it could also 
achieve any targeted goal for deposit measures, such as M2+CD. Fed and Bank of England did not have window guidance. The 
reason for abandoning targets for money growth and instead setting interest rates as a way of making monetary policy comes from 
1970s when prior stable relationship between money growth and either inflation or nominal income growth no longer existed 
(more in Friedman, Kutter (2010)). 
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return on assets. Differently put, commercial banks are important vehicle in credit creation6.  
However, the ability of banks to create credit does not necessarily mean that credit will be 
created.   
Credit can be either used for transactions that are within GDP accounting and within non-
GDP accounting, such as all asset (real estate) and financial transactions. Thus during the last 
several decades we have observed increased amount of credit that has been used in financial 
and real estate transactions and therefore traditional quantity equation has recorded a decline 
in velocity (say M2, M3 velocity) since raising part of the money supply was used for non-GDP 
transactions. 
Chart 1. Money Velocity, M3 
 
 Federal reserve does not publish M3 since 2006. 
                       Source: Bloomberg 
In sum, the accurate representation of money supply in a large non-cash based economy is 
credit creation7. It is important to distinguish between productive credit creation, which is 
used for the creation of new goods and services, and which is non-inflationary, and 
unproductive credit creation, which leads to one of two types of inflation. Unproductive credit 
creation can take the form of “consumptive credit”, which is the extension of credit for the 
consumption (but not creation) of goods and services – consumer price inflation (which hasn’t 
been observed due to emerging markets and China integration in the world economy with vast 
productive capacity and labor force). Unproductive credit creation can also take the form of 
non-GDP credit, which is credit created for the use in asset or financial transactions (observed 
in the USA, elsewhere). Excessive (>GDP growth rates) unproductive credit creation is 
unsustainable in the medium to long run8. When banks are exposed to unproductive credit, 
they are exposed to asset price fluctuations. Consequently, if prices fall (when borrowing 
(credit) raises quicker than income (GNDI which is equal to GDP) is growing, at one stage the 
                                                          
6 An accurate representation of credit creation is given in (Werner (2009)) 
7 Via regression analysis, credit to productive part of GDP has been proved to be the most efficient in explaining the long turn 
performance. Other variable such as interest rates, M0,  M2 monetary aggregates are insignificant at conventional level of alpha. 
Bank credit appears to be in a stable long-term relationship with nominal GDP growth.  
8 The problem with contemporary monetary policy is that credit creation vehicle is given to commercial banks. Being private 
entities, they aim at raise in profitability and do not consider social wellbeing when conducting regular business. Short-termism  is 
associated with raise in leverage and boom-bust cycles.  
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borrower will not be able to pay back/refinance all those loans) and as bank assets shrink, they 
can no longer expand credit to productive sector (and neither to unproductive) – this is Fisher’s 
debt deflation theory.  
What Japan did in 70s via window guidance is it literally forced banks to lend, and since 
external demand existed (Japan was major exporter to EOCD9), recovery followed. Central 
banks today do not target amount of credit. Central banks target short term interest rates and 
bank reserves. Bank reserves, being part of high powered money today have skyrocketed 
(Chart 2).  
Chart 2. M1 Money Aggregate 
 
                             Source: Bloomberg 
This gives banks an ability (but does not obligate) to increase credit in the economy. Banks 
prefer to recycle these reserves back to the Fed (excess reserves) or purchase government 
bonds. Banks do not create credit in the economy. At every level of interest rate there is 
demand for credit and as interest rate approaches 0, demand for credit raises. It is up to the 
bank to make the decision on whether to grant credit or not. When bank assets are impaired 
(from credit to unproductive economy), credit supplied for productive use is constrained.  
The monetarist prescription to increase high-powered money (and their subset, bank reserves) 
has so far failed. It has failed in Japan in the 1990s, 2001 to boost the economy. As long as 
banks are burdened with asset prices significantly below par (or deflated, unmarketable, level 
3 assets without market valuation), they will not want to increase credit and money multiplier 
will not work.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Werner (2003) 
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Chart 3. Money Multiplier 
 
                             Source: Bloomberg 
The Kaynesian and post-Keynesian prescription of fiscal expansion has failed to boost 
Japanese economy  - Werner (2004) showed that when government spending is financed not by 
monetization (thus increasing money supply, credit) but by bond issue, no new purchasing 
power is created but money is redistributed from private sector to the government, leaving 
GDP unchanged (in Y=C+I+G+NX). From regression analysis, Werner (2004) showed that for 
every yen in government spending that is not monetized, private demand shrinks by 0.957 yen 
(approx 1 yen)10. Borrowing from abroad will not necessarily diminish purchasing power in the 
economy (if central bank does not sterilize increase in money supply). However, FX borrowing 
ceiling should be lower than local currency ceiling since foreign currency cannot be printed.  
Interest rate channel does not work when interest rates approach 0 (fed funds at 0-0.25%, 
liquidity trap). Since BoJ bought only high quality paper and disregarded problematic assets, 
attempt to boost credit has been ineffective. QE in the US is more efficient since the Fed took 
on its balance sheet not only US sovereign obligations, but also unmarketable MBS.  
Nonetheless, the amount of expansion in credit and the amount that the Fed can take on the 
balance sheet is not comparable (shadow banking system liabilities of about USD 20 Trill. at 
high in 2007). If the Fed had taken all impaired assets on the balance sheet and paid for them 
at par, dollar sustainability would be questioned. Therefore even correct in its approach, the 
magnitude of the problem is too great to be solved via such a swap operations (cash of bad 
assets on bank’s balance sheet).  Monetization procedures of such a magnitude can lead to 
severe negative consequences for dollar‘s reserve status which plays major role in USA 
economic growth (borrow cheap from the world and lend with a margin strategy).   
As highlighted above, BoJ has engaged in window guidance in 1970s. This is not an option for 
the Fed today, as it has no legal power to obey banks to lend. What is there in the arsenal to 
fight deflationary pressure? 
                                                          
10
 Kumar and Woo (2010) showed that based on a range of econometric techniques, there is an inverse relationship between initial public debt and 
subsequent growth, controlling for other determinants of growth: on average, a 10 percentage point increase in the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is 
associated with a slowdown in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.2 percentage points per year, with the impact being smaller (around 
0.15) in advanced economies.  
 
5 
 
1. Productive demand for credit comes from economic prosperity or technological progress or 
when the economy moves upper on the value added chain. If there is an ability to improve 
efficiency, then demand from companies would raise demand for credit, and since used 
productively, would not result in bank inflation. This theoretical picture does not in any 
case suggest what monetary authorities should do as there still has to be source of demand 
for this value added production.  Demand is what is needed for the recovery. Demand in 
previous years came from the fact that with appreciating real estate and (of lesser 
importance) stock markets – which has been based on deregulation and consequent credit 
creation, consumers were able to withdraw equity from these assets and spend it. 
Differently put, demand was driven from appreciating assets. In order to remain on the 
same path of growth, not only it is necessary to get values of assets to previous highs, but 
also to keep the same slope of growth.  How likely is that in the current state of event? Not 
very likely. At first, the Fed would have to make up for the gap between market price of 
impaired assets and the par value. This is not consistent with its objective to keep inflation 
low. As discussed, intervention of such an immense size increases probability of dumping 
the dollar as reserve currency (and therefore raising inflation). For these reasons, validity 
of conclusions from analysis of projections for consequent credit growth based on statistical 
analysis of data between 1970 – 2007 should be questioned11. 
 
2. Demand from emerging markets (China, India, etc…) – as shown in Kadish (2010)12, there 
is no private demand in these countries due to financial underdevelopment and economic 
structure. Consumers are not able to withdraw equity from appreciating assets (if assets 
are appreciating) and spend it (not even saying that there is no desire to spend). It seems 
that claim of change in the paradigm and superiority of new emerging market consumer is 
simply not supported by any plausible argument, empirical research or statistical 
analysis13.  
 
Major credit indicators 
 
Credit in the broad term is what matters for asset prices. Asset prices and development of 
financial system is what mattered for growth during the last decade.  Even though we follow 
bank assets as the quickest way to proxy credit creation (banks publish quarterly reports 
quicker than FFA14), liability analysis (from FFA) of traditional and shadow banking system 
gives most comprehensive analysis of interrelations between asset prices (from accounting 
point of view, they are the same). Chart 4 shows that even thought bank assets continued to 
raise after NASDAQ bust, stock markets remained flat to negative for the next several years. 
Since bank assets created credit in the economy, eventually stock markets turned and followed 
the credit creation trend.  
                                                          
11
 According to IMF, lending conditions with bank lending surveys used as a proxy lead credit growth by about 4 quarters ( IMF 
Global Financial Stability Report, 2010 April). This conclusion is based on statistical analysis of the period 1970 – 2001. If we 
assume that there is structural change in fundamentals (if we enter phase of deleveraging), this analysis is invalid by its 
approach. 
12 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652884 
13
 The only demand that can come is from government G in Y=C+I+G+NX. But government demand, if not monetized, soaks money 
from the private sector (crowds it out) producing no intermediate growth. 
14
 Flow of Funds Accounts at the Federal Reserve. 
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Chart 4. Price Performance of Various Assets, USA 
 
INDU – Dow Jones Index; Tot Banks  - sum of commercial banks' liabilities and shadow 
banks' liabilities; DBLCIX – DB commodity Index; SPXS10  - Case-Shiller Home Price Index 
                                Source: US Flow of Funds Accounts, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg 
Chart 5 shows the relationship between bank assets (or credit proxy in the economy) and 
NIKKEI index.  
Chart 5. Correlation between Credit and Stock Market 
 
Bank Asset – Bank assets of selected banks from Bloomberg database. NKY – NIKKEI 
Index. 
                     Source: Bloomberg 
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The ultimate question is: is there a reflexive relationship between bank credit and stock 
market valuation which reflect expectations of future earnings. Intuition suggests that this is 
not stable relationship and hardly subject to any “written rule”. Expectations might push 
prices up which might reinforce confidence in further growth and result in self reinforcing 
expansionary process. However, if expectations are not supported by fundamentals, eventually 
reverse self-reinforcing process will be engaged. Consistency between expectations (stock 
market) and actual credit creation (bank assets) is what inevitably experiences stable 
relationship in the long run. Appendix I discusses credit monitoring approach in the economy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Excessive (>nominal GDP growth) unproductive credit creation (as in Japan in 70s, 80s) leads 
to subsequent crisis and deleveraging periods. Japan has forced banks to lend in the 70s. Since 
credit was used productively, this has resulted in economic recovery (Japan was major exporter 
to OECD15). In 90s, window guidance has been cancelled and banks being burdened with bad 
assets stopped lending. As credit constraint seems to be primary source of problem for 
productive economy, deflation followed. Neither Fed, nor ECB can force banks to lend. In order 
to achieve this task, large quantity of unmarketable assets have to be removed from 
commercial banks’ balance sheets to the central bank balance sheet – this can result in 
abandonment of USD, EUR as reserve currencies. Government support is constrained for 2 
reasons: Japan experience shows that local borrowing, if not monetized, simply redistributes 
demand from private sector to public, not affecting GDP in the long run. Borrowing in foreign 
currency is constrained by definition as foreign currency cannot be printed. It is subject to roll-
over risk and sudden hike in the cost of borrowing. The most important economic statistics to 
follow is credit creation in the economy via various proxies. Without credit, recovery is not 
possible by definition due to tight relationship between credit and nominal GDP growth. The 
quickest proxy that indicates whether credit is growing is bank asset quarterly reporting 
(aggregate for large number of banks). Results for Q2 do not indicate any improvement neither 
for the US, nor for Europe. Consequently, the best assets to have during the period of deflation 
are: long long term treasury bonds, short precious metals.  
 
In Appendix II we show that analysis of M2 as a proxy for credit in the economy is meaningless 
both for developed countries (with securitization market) and emerging economies (where 
credit is taken in foreign currency from banks that are effectively foreign banks’ subsidiaries. 
M3 for Europe is somewhat more meaningful than M3 in the USA due to lower level of 
securitization market development. We speculate that in any case, analysis of Bank Assets 
(commercial and shadow where existent) is the quickest way of analysis of credit developments 
in the economy.  
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Werner (2003) 
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Appendix I 
1. Major data for analysis (Flow of Funds Accounts, IMF domestic credit, etc…) is being reported 
with significant lag. Bloomberg database which is constructed from quarterly reports 
published by the banks is the quickest proxy for credit in the economy. Very few companies in 
the EU have reported their 2010 Q2 figures. Based on 2010 Q1 figures bank assets are either 
contracting or flat in Europe. Around 45% of selected sample of US banks have reported their 
2010 Q2 figures. Based on 2010 Q2 estimates, bank assets are contracting in the USA.  
2. M2 is not a good proxy for measuring credit change in US economy, therefore it is disregarded 
from analysis – discussed below. 
3. Bank liabilities (traditional banks as well as shadow banking system) for the US is a good 
proxy for estimating growth. Since 1995, change in the stock of credit has explained about half 
of GDP movements16. Differently put, significant part of economic growth (GDP) has been 
driven by banks’ credit increase. Q2 data for the Flow of Funds Accounts is not yet available. 
Based on 2010 Q1 data, shadow banks’ liabilities are severely contracting while commercial 
banks’ liabilities are neither contracting nor growing.  
4. IMF data is only available for 2010 Q1. Credit proxy from IMF is neither contracting nor 
growing for both US, Europe. 
5. Debt aggregates point to overall start of deleveraging process in the USA as of Q1 2010 
Chart 1. US Bank Liabilities, Trill. USD. 
 
Traditional bank liabilities refer to total liabilities of the commercial banking sector (line 19 
of Table L 109 in Flow of Funds Accounts). Shadow bank liabilities (netted from overlaps 
with Table L 109) refer to the sum of total outstanding open market paper (line 1 of Table L 
208), total repo liabilities (line 1 of Table L 207), net securities loaned (line 20 of Table L 
130), total  GSE liabilities and pool securities (lines 21 and 6 of Tables L 124 and L 125, 
respectively), total liabilities of ABS issuers (line 11 of Table L 126), and total shares 
outstanding of money market mutual funds (line 13 of Table L 121).  
       Source: US Flow of Funds Accounts, Federal Reserve. 
 
                                                          
16 Appendix II 
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Chart 2. US M3 Aggregate, Bil. USD 
M3 monetary aggregate is reconstructed artificially. Federal Reserve does not publish M3 
aggregate any more. M3 is reconstructed in the following way: the non-M2 components of 
M3 include institutional money funds (Bloomberg), large time deposits (Table L5 (line 9)) 
from Flow of Funds Accounts as well as total finance federal funds transactions and loans 
made under security repurchase agree liability (Table L 207 (line 1)) 
         Source: US Flow of Funds Accounts, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg 
 
Chart 3. US Banks’ Total Assets, Bil. USD 
 
The total of all short and long-term assets as reported on the balance sheet 
(BS_TOT_ASSET in Bloomberg). Largest 326 banks are being analyzed. 
                Source: Bloomberg 
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Chart 4. Various US Debt Indicators, Bil. USD, USA 
 
Total households - includes home mortgage debt, consumer credit (D3 table in Flow of Funds Accounts). Total business - 
includes corporate debt outstanding (D3 table in Flow of Funds Accounts). Total government - includes state and local 
governments as well as federal government debt (D3 table in Flow of Funds Accounts). Total domestic nonfinancial sector - 
sum of total household debt, total business debt and total government debt. Total domestic financial sector - D3 table in 
Flow of Funds Accounts. Total domestic nonfinancial sector and domestic financial sector - sum of total domestic 
nonfinancial sector and total domestic financial sector.  
     Source: US Flow of Funds Accounts, Federal Reserve 
Chart 5. IMF Private and Public Sector Claims, Bil. USD, USA 
 
Private/public sector claims are obtained for IMF International Financial Statistics. Taken from 
section 30 - data for the central bank and other depositary corporations that is consolidated into 
Depositary Corporations Survey. 
           Source: IMF 
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US M2 aggregate, as presented below, turns out to be a bad proxy for monitoring 
credit developments in the economy  - chart not presented. 
 
Chart 6. EU M3 Aggregate, Bil. EUR 
 
M2 + repurchase agreements + money market funds and papers + debt securities issued up 
to 2 years 
Source: ECB 
Chart 7. EU Banks’ Total Assets, local currency, Bil. 
 
The total of all short and long-term assets as reported on the balance sheet (BS_TOT_ASSET 
in Bloomberg). Sample consists of 38 institutions in the EU.  
              Source: Bloomberg 
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Chart 8. IMF Private and Public Sector Claims, Bil. EUR, EU 
 
Private/public sector claims are obtained fro IMF International Financial Statistics. Taken 
from section 30 - data for the central bank and other depositary corporations that is 
consolidated into Depositary Corporations Survey. 
                 Source: IMF 
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Appendix II 
GDP is a flow concept, monetary aggregate is a stock concept, therefore nominal GDP data is 
regressed on change in the monetary aggregates as well as change in commercial bank 
liabilities and shadow bank liabilities. As can be seen in Table 1, M2 coefficient is insignificant; 
however all the rest coefficients are statistically significant. 
Table 1. 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP   
Method: Least Squares   
 
Included observations: quarterly/annual 
observations since 1995 17, USA   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
M2  6.217665 1.749894 0.1107 
 
M3  1.497059 2.970404 0.0140 
M3 R-squared 0.468744   
     
COMM  2.188365 3.100076 0.0112 
COMM R-squared 0.490068    
 
SHADOW  0.843337 2.398460 0.0374 
SHADOW R-squared 0.365184    
 
TOTBANKS  0.621558 2.825636 0.0180 
TOTBANKS R-squared 0.443957    
     
Traditional bank liabilities (COMM) refer to total liabilities of the commercial banking 
sector (line 19 of Table L 109 in Flow of Funds Accounts). Shadow bank liabilities 
(SHADOW, netted from overlaps with Table L 109) refer to the sum of total 
outstanding open market paper (line 1 of Table L 208), total repo liabilities (line 1 of 
Table L 207), net securities loaned (line 20 of Table L 130), total  GSE liabilities and 
pool securities (lines 21 and 6 of Tables L 124 and L 125, respectively), total liabilities 
of ABS issuers (line 11 of Table L 126), and total shares outstanding of money market 
mutual funds (line 13 of Table L 121). Source: Federal Reserve, Author’s regressions 
R squared suggests that change in the stock of credit explains about half of GDP. 
Even thought M2 monetary aggregate for the USA remained flat (data not presented), it gives 
no valuable information on economy growth whatsoever. Since securitization market has 
evolved significantly, this aggregate is simply too narrow to represent the overall economy. 
Shadow and commercial bank liabilities are better proxies for state of the economy. As evident 
form regression results in Table 2, total bank liabilities (commercial +shadow, i.e. BANK) is a 
better proxy for the US to track credit developments in the economy than M3 monetary 
aggregate. Dow Jones Industrial Index is not significantly related to credit developments 
during the sample period. Stock markets seem to experience long term deviations from credit 
                                                          
171995 is a point of structural change in economy fundamentals, i.e. deregulation in mortgage market as well as beginning of stock 
bull market, (see http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652884) 
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developments in the economy. Housing is strongly related to credit developments (credit leads 
housing price growth, regression results not presented here).  
Table 2. 
 
Method: Least Squares   
 
Included observations: 57, quarterly,1996-2010, USA  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
Dependent Variable: BANKt-1    
GDPt  8.87E-07 -3.611488 0.0007 
HOUSEt  0.062732 -1.681984 0.0985 
R-squared 0.197618   
Dependent Variable: BANKt-1    
GDPt  8.98E-07 -3.537336 0.0009 
HOUSEt  0.064025 -1.702706 0.0946 
INDUt-1  0.020078 0.353934 0.7248 
R-squared 0.199547    
Dependent Variable: M3t    
GDPt  1.06E-06 -2.626169 0.0113 
HOUSEt  0.076834 -0.902972 0.3706 
INDUt  0.024546 0.236422 0.8140 
R-squared 0.121412    
Dependent Variable: M3t-1    
GDPt  1.08E-06 -1.430837 0.1585 
HOUSEt  0.076680 0.669083 0.5064 
INDUt-1  0.024047 0.229621 0.8193 
R-squared 0.085413    
GDP – nominal GDP; HOUSE – Log of price change in S&P Case-Shiller Composite 10 
Home Price Index; INDU –log of change in  Dow Jones Industrial Index; BANK – Log of 
change in bank liabilities (SHADOW+ COMMERCIAL). Traditional bank liabilities 
(COMMERCIAL) refer to total liabilities of the commercial banking sector (line 19 of 
Table L 109 in Flow of Funds Accounts). Shadow bank liabilities (SHADOW, netted 
from overlaps with Table L 109) refer to the sum of total outstanding open market 
paper (line 1 of Table L 208), total repo liabilities (line 1 of Table L 207), net securities 
loaned (line 20 of Table L 130), total  GSE liabilities and pool securities (lines 21 and 6 
of Tables L 124 and L 125, respectively), total liabilities of ABS issuers (line 11 of Table 
L 126), and total shares outstanding of money market mutual funds (line 13 of Table L 
121). M3 is reconstructed in the following way: the non-M2 components of M3 include 
institutional money funds (Bloomberg), large time deposits (Table L5 (line 9)) from Flow 
of Funds Accounts as well as total finance federal funds transactions and loans made 
under security repurchase agree liability (Table L 207 (line 1)). Source: Federal 
Reserve, Bloomberg, Author’s regressions. 
 
Results for EU indicate relationship between real estate prices, housing prices the stock 
market and M3 monetary aggregate (Table 3). M3 in EU is more correlated with the economy 
than in the US. It is not surprising, considering that securitization market is less developed in 
EU and economy is more reliant on traditional commercial banks.   
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Table 3. 
 
Method: Least Squares   
 
Included observations: 14, annual,1996-2010   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
Dependent Variable: M3t    
HOUSEt  0.228190 2.651364 0.0243 
DAXt  0.021809 -0.542683 0.5992 
GDPt  1.84E-08 1.535871 0.1556 
R-squared 0.529111    
Dependent Variable: M3t-1    
HOUSEt  0.183087 -0.328642 0.7499 
GDPt  1.59E-08 3.379943 0.0081 
DAXt-1  0.017065 -0.253909 0.8053 
R-squared 0.585855    
M3 - M2 + repurchase agreements + money market funds and papers + debt securities 
issued up to 2 years, log of change; GDP – nominal GDP, Region: EU15; HOUSE – Log 
of price change in Residential Property Price Index Statistics, Euro area 12; DAX – 
German Stock Exchange Index, log of price change. Source: Eurostat, European Central 
Bank,  Federal Reserve, Bloomberg, Author’s regressions. 
Emerging market proxy is being considered through Czech Republic (Table 4). Czech Republic 
is often used in research as sample country for the level of its financial development and data 
quality (see Bezemer, Werner (2009)). Regression results show that Bank Assets (credit proxy) 
is significantly correlated with the economy (GDP, house prices, equity markets to some 
extent).  
 
Table 4. 
 
Method: Least Squares   
 
Included observations: 8, after adjustment, 
annual, 2000-2009.   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
Dependent Variable: BANKt-1    
HOUSEt  0.198466 3.787196 0.0193 
GDPt  5.52E-05 4.350786 0.0121 
INDEXt  0.024191 2.024578 0.1129 
R-squared 0.923002    
Dependent Variable: M2t-1    
HOUSEt  0.407989 0.731529 0.5050 
GDPt  0.000113 0.395255 0.7128 
INDEXt  0.049730 -0.449513 0.6763 
R-squared 0.456755    
BANK – log of change in bank assets, sample bank – Komercni Banka,  M2 - Monetary 
aggregate includes currency in circulation, demand deposits, time and saving deposits 
and foreign currency deposits, log of change; HOUSE - Price indices of selected kinds of 
real estate, log of change; INDEX – The Prague Stock Exchange PX-Glob Index, log of 
change; GDP – nominal GDP. Source: Czech Statistical Office, Bloomberg, Czech 
National Bank, Author’s regressions. 
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These results are consistent with findings of Cull, Soledad and Peria (2007), who showed that 
foreign banks have access to a larger pool of loanable funds that can help them sustain higher 
levels of lending. Giannetti and Onegena (2005)  employ a large panel of almost 60 000 firm-
year observations on listed and unlisted companies in Eastern Europe to investigate the 
impact of foreign bank lending on firm sales, assets and leverage. They found that foreign 
lending stimulates growth in firm sales, assets and leverage.  
 
Wu, Luca and Jeon (2007) find evidence that, consistent with the bank lending channel, 
foreign banks show smaller sensitivity to domestic monetary policy shocks than domestic 
peers. This is consistent with the existence of an internal capital market for global banks, that 
is, foreign subsidiaries have access to funds transferred by their parent companies that shields 
them from domestic monetary shocks. M2 in emerging markets, where credit is borrowed in 
foreign currency, loses its relevancy. Bank  under study for credit proxy in Czech Republic has 
been part of Société Générale Group since 2001. Consequently it can have increased credit in 
the economy irrespective of Central Bank operations. 
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